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Perkins: Constitutional Law - When the Prohibition on Judicial Taxation In

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-When the Prohibition on Judicial
Taxation Interferes with an Equitable Remedy in a School
Desegregation Case. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651
(1990).
The Missouri v. Jenkins litigation began when the Kansas City
Missouri School District (KCMSD) and a group of students from the
KCMSD filed an action in United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against the State of Missouri. The suit alleged
that the State and the surrounding school districts had operated a
dual school system in the Kansas City metropolitan area.' After realigning KCMSD as a defendant, the district court found that the
State of Missouri and KCMSD had failed in their collective duty to
eliminate the vestiges of a segregated school system within the

KCMSD.2

Accordingly, the district court issued an order outlining the remedies necessary to eliminate the remnants of the dual school system
and to finance the implementation of those remedies.' While concluding that it had the power to order a tax increase, the district court,
instead of ordering a tax increase, enjoined the State from enforcing

state laws that would have prevented
KCMSD from raising taxes to
4
fund the desegregation plan.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings of liability and remedial actions, and modified the district court's cost allocation between KCMSD and the State. 5
Meanwhile, the district court moved forward with the enforcement of the desegregation plan approving several plans proposed by
KCMSD, each one more elaborate and expensive than the previous
one.' KCMSD's desegregation plans continued to be plagued with
1. School Dist. of Kansas City v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
2. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1505 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The district
court found the State had taken positive actions which discriminated against blacks.
The State had intentionally mandated separate white and black schools, established
separate institutions for educating black teachers, established and maintained a separate institution of higher learning for blacks, and had authorized local school authorities to establish separate libraries, parks and playgrounds. Id. at 1503. Additionally, it
was the mandate of the State, not the KCMSD School Board, that had originally created a dual school system within the KCMSD. Id. at 1504.
3. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The original estimated
cost of the remedy was about $88,000,000 over three years. Id. at 43-44. The district
court also concluded that the Missouri Constitution infringed on the KCMSD's ability
to raise taxes sufficient to fund the cost of the program. Id. at 45. The problem the
district court faced was that the Missouri Constitution prohibited increasing property
taxes without a referendum vote. Mo. CorNsT., art. X, § 22(a).
4. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 45 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
5. Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 686 (8th Cir. 1986). The district court originally determined that Missouri should bear most of the costs, reasoning that the State
was the more culpable party in creating school segregation. Id. at 684.
6. The original plan called for KCMSD to operate six magnet schools during the
1986-1987 school year, and a capital improvements budget of $37,000,000, to be spent
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failed at the polls and the state
funding problems when tax initiatives
7
legislature was unwilling to help.
At this point, the district court concluded that in order to provide
a remedy, it had no other option than to use its broad equitable powers to render a judgment that would enable KCMSD to meet its financial obligations.' The district court then ordered the KCMSD property tax levy raised from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100 of assessed valuation,
and directed the issue of $150,000,000 in capital improvement bonds.9
The State appealed the decision of the district court, challenging
the scope of the desegregation remedy, the apportionment of cost between the KCMSD and the State, and the tax increase.'" A panel of
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the desegregation order and the apportionment of cost, but held that in the future, the district court should
not levy the tax directly; instead, the district court should authorize
KCMSD to submit a tax levy to the state tax collection authorities
and enjoin the State from hindering the collection of revenue necessary to fund KCMSD's program."'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the tension between two well established judicial doctrines; the broad
equitable powers of federal courts to enforce equal protection rights in
desegregation cases, and the prohibition on the federal judiciary to
exercise taxing powers generally reserved to the legislature. This casenote will discuss the Court's attempt to reconcile these two doctrines,
and suggests that while the language of the Court's decision would
allow the federal courts' fourteenth amendment remedial powers to
overreach constitutional prohibitions on judicial interference with the
taxing power, the practical effect of the decision was an acceptable
compromise between the two doctrines.

over three years. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 402 (W.D. Mo. 1987). A year
later, the district court authorized an additional $12,877,330 for capital improvements.
The district court later approved a long range magnet school program in which all high
schools, middle schools, and one-half of the elementary schools were to become magnet
schools. The accompanying capital improvements budget was $52,858,301. Id. The total capital improvements budget for the long range magnet school plan required an
additional $187,450,334, or a total of $250,308,635 over five years. Id. at 414-15.
7. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1657 (1990). KCMSD tried to pass the
tax increases by referendum vote in accordance with state law, but each one failed to
find support among a sufficient number of the voters. Id. KCMSD also approached
members of state government in an effort to secure funding assistance, but was unsuccessful. Id.
8. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 412 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (quoting Griffin v.
Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964)).
9. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 413 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
10. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988).
11. Id. at 1314. Upon denial of rehearing by the Eighth Circuit, the State petitioned for writ of certiorari,which was granted to consider the State's argument that
the district court lacked power to raise local property taxes. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at
1654.
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BACKGROUND

The landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I)12 upheld the right of the Nation's black school children to attend non-segregated public schools. The Court concluded
that separate but equal systems for white and black students deprived
black school children of equal educational opportunities, and, therefore, violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 8
In a hearing on the effects that Brown would have on the Nation's
school systems, the Court recognized that district courts needed broad
equitable powers to give flexibility in shaping remedies, and ordered
desegregation be made "with all deliberate speed."'"
In Green v. County School Board, more than a decade after
Brown I, the Court concluded that little progress toward desegregation had been made, and held that local school authorities had an affirmative duty to come forward with a realistic plan that promised to
work.18 In Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education, the
Court further expanded federal court remedial power by imposing an
immediate affirmative duty on local authorities to desegregate school
systems.1" In Swann, the Court empowered the district court to take
specific and detailed actions to remedy intentional school segregation
under certain circumstances. 17 However, the Court also wanted to
avoid replacing the authority of local elected officials, and would permit such drastic judicial intervention only if the offending school district failed to submit an adequate desegregation plan."'
In Milliken v. Bradley,18 the Supreme Court curbed the expansion of remedial power by limiting the federal courts' equitable power
to remedy public school segregation. The Milliken Court reversed a
district court remedy and confined the remedy to the boundaries of
the offending school district, and, thereby, required that the scope of
the desegregation remedy be geographically matched to the scope of
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Id.

14. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). The
Court was concerned with the effect that Brown I would have on local school authorities and invited further argument from the states on the relief question. Id. at 298-99.
The Court also charged district courts with supervising the efforts of local school authorities in implementing adequate desegregation plans. Id. at 299.
15. 391 U.S. 430, 437-39 (1968). The Court was faced with a freedom-of-choice
program which allowed students to attend the school of their choice. The Court found
that the program not only failed to remedy segregation in the County's public schools,

but worked to preserve the dual school system. Id. at 441-42.
16. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The district court was given broad powers to take specific
steps to effectuate a desegregation plan because the school district's proposed remedy
was inadequate. Specific acts the district court could take under such circumstances
included the hiring of faculty and staff, busing, and extracurricular activities. Id. at 18.
17. Id. at 15-16.
18. Id. at 16.
19. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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the violation.2 0 The Court refused to allow the district court's equitable power to circumvent the deeply rooted tradition of local control
over the operation of schools.2 1
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton 1)22 reaffirmed
the Court's decision in Milliken by holding that the district courts'
power to fashion equitable desegregation remedies had limits, and
that absent a system-wide violation, no system-wide remedy could be
ordered. 2 In other words, the Dayton School District was not responsible for segregation it did not cause.2 ' In a later proceeding between
the same parties, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton
I),2" the Court did not overrule Dayton 1, but was inconsistent with
its Dayton I holding because the Court expanded, instead of limited,
the scope of the district courts' inquiry into segregation in public
schools.2 The Court's reasoning created a presumption of intentional
segregation by the Dayton School District if (1) segregation had existed within the school district in 1954, and (2) evidence of currently
segregated schools existed.2 7 Dayton II expanded the influence the
federal courts have over school systems by making school systems responsible for segregation they may have only caused indirectly.2 8
In the recent decision of Spallone v. United States," the Supreme Court again limited the use of broad equitable powers to remedy fourteenth amendment violations; this time to correct housing
segregation. The Court upheld contempt citations against the City of
Yonkers, New York, but reversed the district court's contempt cita-

20. Id. at 745. The district court determined that an interdistrict remedy was ap-

propriate because the State of Michigan and the Detroit School District committed
intentional acts that created and maintained a segregated school system. The neighboring school districts were not parties to the action, but the district court included

the other school districts in the remedial order. Id. at 728. The scope of remedy exceeded the scope of the violation by ordering non-segregated school districts to be in-

cluded in the desegregation plan of the segregated school district. Id. at 745.

21. Id. at 741. The district court's plan would have required the consolidation of
some fifty-four independent school districts into one super district. The Supreme
Court considered not only the long history of local autonomy of school administration,
but also the tremendous logistical problems and the practicality of the proposed solution. Id. at 742. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken HI) (The
Supreme Court upheld the revised desegregation plan which required Michigan to pay

one half the costs.).
22. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).

23. Id. at 420.
24. Id. at 421.
25. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).

26. Comment, Overcoming Original Sin: The Redemption of the Desegregated
School System, 27 Hous. L. REv. 557, 589 (1990).

27. Id. at 589.
28. Id.
29. 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990). The development authority of the City of Yonkers, New

York, was found to have located public housing in order to maintain segregated housing within the city. The City entered into a consent decree to pass legislation to end its
discriminatory practices. When the city council refused to enact such legislation, the

district court held the city in contempt, and also found each of the council members
who voted against the legislation in contempt personally. Id.
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tions against the individual members of the city council80
In the context of school desegregation, the counterpoint to the
federal courts' broad remedial powers is the reluctance of federal
courts to intrude on the taxing power. This reluctance has its origins
in the Constitution. The taxing power is expressly granted to the legislative branch.8 1 On the other hand, the constitutional grant of power
to the judiciary has no language indicating that it shares in Congress'
taxing power."3 The Framers of the Constitution knew the dangers of
giving life-tenured judges control over the purse of the nation. 3 Such
dangers include inadequate representation by those who are to be
taxed, and inadequate political accountability of the life-tenured
judiciary.84
Consistent with the intent of the Framers, the Supreme Court has
generally required that the taxing power be left in the hands of the
legislative branch. In Londoner v. Denver,"5 the Court had to decide
whether a state legislature could constitutionally delegate the taxing
power to an executive agency. The Court struck down the delegation
of taxing power because the executive agency could not meet the due
process required before imposing a tax, nor was the agency accountable to the electorate."6
The Court has also held independent attempts to exercise the
taxing power by the executive branch to be unconstitutional. For example, in National Cable Television Association v. United States, 7
the Court struck down the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) policy requiring that cable television companies pay fees to the
FCC based on the number of cable subscribers each company serviced. The fee assessments were designed to make the FCC's oversight
function self-funding. The Court concluded that the fee was too similar to the assessment and levy of taxes, and that only Congress could
impose such a tax.38
The Court has also restrained federal courts from interfering with
a state's exercise of its taxing power. In Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v.
Grant County,3 9 the Court reversed a district court order which sub30. Id. at 634-35.
31. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect

Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises ....
Id.
32. Id., art. III.
33. See The Federalist No. 48, at 332 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), and The
Federalist No. 78, at 521 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Judicially imposed taxes

represent a union of the judiciary and legislative branches, and represent a move toward tyranny. The Federalist No. 78 at 523.

34. The Federalist No. 78 at 523.
35. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).

36. Id. at 385.

37. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).

38. Id. at 341.

39. 365 U.S. 744 (1961). The lower court correctly struck down a county taxing
scheme that discriminated against developers that leased property from the United
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1991
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stituted a valid tax for an invalid one because federal courts have no
authority to assess or levy taxes on behalf of states or their political
subdivisions. 0 The Court, as recently as 1989, refused to allow a district court to broaden a class of taxpayers in order to make an invalid
tax valid because the taxing power is beyond the remedial power of
the federal judiciary." However, none of the precedents cited have
had to resolve judicial intervention in the taxing power in the context
of the remedial power of federal courts under the fourteenth amendment, as was the case in Jenkins.
PRINCIPAL CASE

The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, reversed the district court's direct levy of additional property taxes on the people of
KCMSD to fund a desegregation plan for the public schools. "2 The
majority opinion, written by Justice White,"' concluded that a district
court could directly impose taxes only if there was no less intrusive
remedy."
Justice White rejected the State's contention that the tax increase violated article III of the Constitution and the tenth amendment.45 Justice White considered the district court's imposition of a

tax increase to be an improper assumption of the taxing power, and,
therefore, the district court contravened the principles of federal and
state comity."' Consequently, Justice White reasoned that the Court
did not need to reach the constitutional questions raised by the
State. 47 Justice White, however, concluded that a district court could
impose a tax, but that a district court was first obligated to assure
itself that no other permissible means would have accomplished the
same end.'
States, but incorrectly ordered a change in the tax so that the tax would be valid. Id.
40. Id. at 751.

41. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500 (1989). Davis, a retired
federal employee, brought suit against the state for discriminatorily taxing federal retirement benefits while exempting state retirement benefits. The Court would not allow the district court to broaden a class of taxpayers in order to cure an unconstitutional tax because to do so could be construed to be the direct imposition of a state
tax. Id. at 1509. The Court decided Davis on the basis of intergovernmental tax immunity, not on the basis of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 1508.
42. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
43. Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 1655.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1662.
46. Id. Sometimes called cooperative federalism, comity is the working relationship of our co-sovereign Union. The mutual deference between the state and federal
governments, while not explicit in the Constitution, is the day-to-day working principle of our Union. B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, FEDERAL AND STATE

PowEas 80-83 (1963).

47. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1662-63.

48. Id.
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Justice White concluded that the less intrusive alternative recommended by the Eighth Circuit was the appropriate remedy.19 The district court could authorize or require the KCMSD to levy property
taxes sufficient to fund its part of the desegregation plan, and enjoin
the operation of the State laws that would prevent the KCMSD from
exercising its taxing power.' This approach placed on local school authorities the primary responsibility of solving their own segregation
problems, which is a traditional objective of equitable remedies in desegregation cases.5'
Although he previously concluded that the constitutional issues
need not be reached, Justice White next addressed constitutional issues raised by the dissent. He determined that "[t]he Tenth Amendment[]. . .is not implicated by a federal-court judgment enforcing the
express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment." ' Therefore, a court order directing local authorities to levy taxes that they are already empowered to levy is within
the power of the federal judiciary."
Finally, Justice White addressed the power of a federal court to
enjoin state law. Missouri argued that a political subdivision, such as
the KCMSD, derives its power, including the power to tax, from the
state. 5" Therefore, Missouri claimed the district court could not enjoin
the State's taxing power to restrict the raising of taxes on one hand,
and order the political subdivision to exercise that same taxing power
to increase taxes on the other. 5 Justice White rejected this argument
by relying on precedents that restrict state action under article I, section 10, clause 1, the contracts clause, of the Constitution, and the
preemptive effect on states of obligations imposed by the fourteenth
amendment.' He considered the funding of the court-approved desegregation plan to be an obligation imposed by the fourteenth amendment on the KCMSD, and that state laws impeding the discharge of
that obligation must yield if such laws interfere with constitutional
guarantees."'
In dissent, Justice Kennedy58 concluded that the district court
49.
50.
51.
52.
patrick

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1665.
Id. (quoting Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. at 289); see also Fitzv. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (The Court recognized limitations imposed on

state sovereignty, as embodied in the tenth and eleventh amendments, by the fourteenth amendment.).

53. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665 (citing Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince William

County, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964)).
54. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1666.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45

(1971)).
58. Justice Kennedy was joined in his dissent by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,

and Scalia. Jenkins, 110 S.Ct. at 1667 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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had overreached its judicial power by levying a tax."9 He also considered the majority's reversal of the judicially imposed tax levy while
upholding the district court's authority to order the school district to
levy a tax, to be a distinction without a difference.60
Justice Kennedy concluded that the majority's opinion would allow federal courts to overreach the judiciary's constitutional powers.
After noting the apparent disregard that KCMSD had for the financial cost of the proposed desegregation plan,6 Justice Kennedy contended that the judicial taxation sustained by the majority was without parallel, and that methods of school financing are beyond federal
judicial authority.2 He reasoned that local taxing authorities derive
their power, including the taxing power from the state's constitution.
Accordingly, local taxing authorities are limited to those powers
granted to them by the state. Therefore, if a district court orders the
use of more taxing power than the state has granted, the court order
must be based on the authority of the federal court because the order
has exceeded the power given by the state." Based on this analysis,
Justice Kennedy considered the real issue to be, whether the district
court has direct taxing authority under federal law, or indirectly
through the KCMSD. e4
Justice Kennedy maintained that judicially imposed taxes do not
allow sufficient due process protections and that federal courts could
never exercise the power to assess or levy taxes.6 He then reviewed
the due process rationale of vesting the taxing authority in the legislative branch, and why judicially imposed taxes run afoul of due
process."
Finally, Justice Kennedy answered the majority's contention that
reversing the district court's order would leave the plaintiff without a

remedy. He argued that equal protection, not the extravagance of
KCMSD's particular remedy, is a constitutional guarantee.61
ANALYSIS

While the far-reaching equitable power of the federal courts upheld in Jenkins is alarming, so is the fact that more than three decades after Brown I, segregated school systems still exist in our Nation's cities." The historical role of the federal courts' enforcing the
59. Id. at 1672.
60. Id. at 1670.

61. Id. at 1667.

62. Id. at 1668 (citing National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1977);

Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969)).
63. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

64. Id.

65. Id. (citing Moses Lake Homes v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744 (1961)).
66. Id. at 1671.

67. Id. at 1673.

68. Note, Attacking School SegregationRoot and Branch, 99 YALz L.J. 2003, 2004
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guarantees of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment is
well known.6 ' The very purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to
protect people from racially discriminatory state action. Therefore, it
should not be surprising that the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment have priority over state
sovereignty as embodied in the tenth
70
and eleventh amendments.
The judicial branch, however, derives its authority from article III
of the Constitution. Article III does not use the word tax, or any other
similar concept. 71 Indeed, the Framers intended for the legislature to
"command the purse, but. . .the judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse. . . . 7 In establishing the
framework for the separation of powers among the branches of government, the Framers understood the potential tyranny of a life-tenured judiciary which was not accountable to the electorate: "though
individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of
justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered. . .so long as the judiciary
remains truly distinct from both the
'7
legislative and executive." 3
In Jenkins, the Court's language blurred the lines between the
judicial and the legislative functions of government. The majority,
while reversing the judicially imposed tax, did not recognize any absolute prohibition against the judicial imposition of taxes to remedy segregation in the future."4 The only limit the Court placed on a federal
court's power to directly impose taxes was that there be no other alternative to achieve desegregation. 7 5 In other contexts, the Court has
applied a different standard when it has reviewed executive branch
efforts to assess taxes, stating that "[tiaxation is a legislative function,
and [that] Congress is the sole organ for levying taxes." 6 The Court
has held that federal courts cannot formulate a valid tax to replace an
(1990).
69. See supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
70. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick,the Court had to decide if the general state immunity applied to prevent recovery of a back pay award for state employees who had been discriminated against in the administration of the state employees retirement system.
The Court recognized that the fourteenth amendment is a limit on state power, and,
accordingly, the Court has "sanctioned intrusions. . .into the judicial, executive, and
legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States." Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 455.
71. U.S. CONST., art. III.

72. The Federalist No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
73. Id.
74. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1663. The Court held that before a district court could
impose a tax it "was obliged to assure itself that no permissible alternative would have
accomplished the... task," the funding of judicially mandated remedies. Id.
75. Id.
76. National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340
(1974) (emphasis added) (The Federal Communications Commission was assessing annual fees to cable companies in order to pay for the Commission's administration of
the cable industry; however, the Court held that the fees constituted a tax and could
not be levied by the executive branch.).
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invalid tax because doing so overreaches judicial authority.7
The taxing power rests with the legislative branch because of the
legislature's relationship to the people, and because the legislature is
politically accountable. Taxation by a legislature satisfies due process
because the interests of the taxpayers are represented by their elected
representatives. 78 Taxpayers' due process rights, notice and an opportunity to be heard, are achieved vicariously through their elected officials.79 In effect, taxpayers consent to the tax by electing the legislators who levy the tax.80

In contrast, judicially imposed taxes do not offer these same protections. Federal judges have life-terms, and in many cases may not be
citizens of the community affected by any tax so imposed. 1 In the
traditional judicial setting, the proceedings provide the parties with
due process, notice and an opportunity to be heard, before the court
can deprive a party of his property.82 Judicial proceedings do not provide due process rights to non-parties. 88 Consequently, the adjudication is not binding on non-parties and, therefore, non-parties are not
deprived of property by proceedings to which they are not a party.8'
In the instant case, KCMSD taxpayers were not a party to the
action. However, the Supreme Court's ruling that a district court may,
as a last resort, directly impose a tax in order to give effect to a desegregation remedy, would deprive taxpayers of their property without
due process.8 5 In another context, the Supreme Court has refused to
allow state legislatures to delegate the taxing power to the state executive branch without providing for taxpayers' due process rights.8 Yet
the majority would seem to exempt the district court from providing
those same due process rights to KCMSD taxpayers if the district
court had no other alternative.
Despite the Court's language that the judiciary may directly impose taxes, the practical effect of what the Court did was less drastic.
The Court sustained the broad remedial power of district courts to
oversee local desegregation efforts, and at the same time, observed the
77. Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744 (1961) (The Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit which had directed a district court to replace an invalid tax
that discriminated against federal lessees in favor of county residents with a valid
tax.).
78. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1671 (citing Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1672.
82. Id. at 1671.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908). The Court held that while the
state legislature may assess and apportion taxes to pay for municipal improvements
without petitioning landowners, the state legislature could not delegate that same
power to the City of Denver without violating due process. Id.
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traditional separation of powers framework intended by the Framers.
Ordering the KCMSD to levy taxes is different than directly imposing a tax. The Court has long recognized that the scope of a district court's remedy was determined by the degree of the equal protection violation. 7 As early as Griffin v. School Board of Prince William
County8 8 (1964), for example, the Court ordered local school authorities to use the "power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate and maintain" a desegregated school system
within their county. 9
The rationale behind such an approach to financing a school desegregation plan is to keep the responsibility of desegregation with local school officials. " The KCMSD School Board knew, or should have
known, that their desegregation plan would obligate KCMSD taxpayers. The school board also knew that they would be responsible for
funding some portion of the desegregation plan.9 ' A district court's
order to the school board to raise taxes gives effect to a desegregation
plan which was developed and proposed, not by the district court, but
by KCMSD officials.9 2 Moreover, due process for the KCMSD taxpayers has been met. The KCMSD School Board is an elective body. Taxpayers of KCMSD can effectively register their approval or disapproval at board meetings and at the polls. Since the school board
consists of representatives elected by the taxpayers of KCMSD, the
normal due process that taxpayers receive through their elected representatives was satisfied.
The holding in Jenkins (that the district court may order the
KCMSD to raise taxes) also leaves local school authorities with more
flexibility than if the district court's direct tax had been sustained.
The Court's decision may indirectly allow KCMSD an opportunity to
modify the desegregation plan to reflect the collective will of the taxpayers to fund it.95 If KCMSD taxpayers are unwilling to fund
KCMSD's portion of the elaborate plan presently approved by the
district court, it may yet be possible to reduce the plan to a level that
87. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
88. 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
89. Id. at 233.
90. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
91. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 408 (W.D. Mo. 1987). KCMSD sought
funding relief from the district court by requesting that the State pay an even greater
portion of the costs. Id. Instead of allocating more to the State, the district court ordered the contested tax increases. Id. at 412.
92. Id.

93. Since the district court had already approved less costly desegregation plans
proposed by the KCMSD, see supra note 6, the district court might approve still another modification, this time scaling back the current plan. Given the Jenkins deci-

sion, if the KCMSD proposed a more moderate plan, the State and the KCMSD voters
might more readily approve of the more moderate plan. If a more moderate plan had

the support of both the KCMSD and the State of Missouri, less coercion would be
required of the district court.
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can accomplish desegregation at a more reasonable price. The practical result of Jenkins keeps the responsibilities of implementing and
funding the desegregation plan with local authorities and not with the
federal judiciary.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court faced the unenviable task of reconciling two
divergent judicial doctrines. The Court has consistently upheld the
broad equitable power of federal courts to enforce fourteenth amendment protections against segregation. If the federal court was to give
effect to the local desegregation plan, the plan had to be funded. To
overcome the funding obstacle and give effect to the remedy, the federal court had to directly, or indirectly, control the purse of the local
taxpayers. However, interfering in the taxing power presented the
Court with other constitutional and philosophical concerns.
While the language of the majority's opinion arguably proposes
an expansion of federal judicial power beyond the intent of the Framers, the practical result of the majority's decision comports with the
traditional notions of local supervision and operation of public
schools. 4 At the same time, the Court has reiterated its determination
to afford the district courts the breadth of equitable powers necessary
to combat violations of the fourteenth amendment. By directing the
district court to order the KCMSD to levy taxes sufficient to fund its
portion of the desegregation plan, the Supreme Court has placed the
district court back within the separation of powers intended by the
Framers.
DREW A. PERKINS

94. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. The question not answered by
Jenkins is, under what circumstances, if any, will a district court be left with no alternative but to impose a tax.
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